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THEi UNION, THE NATION, AND m TALKING CROW: 
THE LANGUAGE AND TACTICS OF THE D J D E l ? ~  ICU IN EAST LONDON 




Immediately a f t e r  the 1914-18 w a r ,  South Africa (along with many industr ial  and partly 
industrialized countries) experienced sharp price inf la t ion  and an upsurge of worker 
militancy. It was i n  th i s  environment that  the Industrial & Commerical Workerst Union 
of Africa (ICU) was founded. Under the charismatic leadership of Clements Kadalie, 
the ICU'  S strength l ay  " in  i t s  loose but appealing amalgam of economic and pol i t ica l  
demands, a t t rac t ing  support from the ill-defined groups of dissidents characteristic 
of early industr ial isat ion .. . l f .  (1) After gradual powth i n  most large towns to  the 
mid-1920s, the union expanded rapidly i n  1927, largely through the recruitment of 
agricultural labourers and labour tenants; i ts  membership i n  1928 has been variously 
estimated a t  between 100,000 and 200,000. But by 1929, under a feuding leadership and 
amidst charges of financial mismanagement and tac t ica l  ineptitude, the ICU fragmented 
in to  regionally based groups. Kadalie himself moved to  the port of East London, where 
he presided over the Independent ICU (IICU). 
East London's hinterland had been the arena of a century's confl ict  between 
s e t t l e r s  and Xhosa chiefdoms. Nineteenth century colonization was uneven, and 
stimulated different  responses: the formation of a re la t ive ly  prosperous, often 
S Christian, African peasantry, but also a defensive traditionalism. By the l92Os, much 
of the African ru ra l  population was impoverished, yet  the cul tural  cleavages remained 
deep and were carried in to  the urban setting. (2) A s  the nearest c i ty ,  East London 
became not only a venue f o r  migrants with homes i n  the countryside but also a 
receptacle f o r  refugees from overpopulated black lands and capitalizing white-owned 
farms. 
Industrialization had by and large by-passed East London. I n  the 1920s and 
1930s i t s  ro le  was essential ly an entrep8t role: economic ac t iv i ty  centred on i t s  
harbour, r a i l w a y ,  merchant houses, s m a l l  processing works, and c ra f t  shops. It was i n  
re la t ive  decline, as  its hold over the wool export trade was loosened, and the 
depression of the 1930s accentuated i t s  plight. If the c i t y  a s  a whole was depressed 
by the l a t e  l92Os, the r ac ia l  division of wealth and power meant that  the attendant 
social i l l s  were concentrated i n  two African townships - the East Bank and West Bank 
Locations - which houses a rapidly growing population. (1n 1920, there were c.11,000 
Africans i n  East London; by 1926 there were 17,000; and by 1930 an estimated 20,000.) 
The locations provided a classic  picture of urban slums during rapid but uneven 
capitalist development: overcrowding in grotesquely inadequate housing and an infant 
mortality rate that averaged over 33 per cent in the 1920s (3) were obvious indices. 
The black work-force included permanently urbanized as well as migrant dwellers; only 
a minority of the population was in industrial employment; and there was a substantial 
and growing unemployed and lumpen element. 
Conditions in the locations - and the related issue of social control - 
perturbed a group of influential Xast Londoners, and the 1920s saw their involvement 
in Native Welfare ~ssociation/~oint ~ouncils/~hild Life Protection Society 
activities. (4) These men and women worked closely with a group of location dwellers, 
particularly those educated "leaders" who served on the Native Location Advisory Board 
(Dr W. Rubusana was the most influential of these, who were drawn largely from the 
Bantu Union and from church associations). While these groups pursued improvements in 
housing, sanitation, and welfare (within the framework of the 1923 Urban Areas 
legislation), there was at the same time a greater emphasis in the municipality on more 
efficient administration and policing of the locations. A good deal of police activity 
in the locations could be described under such familiar headings as dagga, beer-brewing, 
permits and passes, and petty crime; there was also an attempt to maintain surveillance 
over any African activities or meetings regarded as potentially "political" or 
agitational. 
Kadalie and other trade union organizers definitely fell into this category - 
and between 1928 and 1933 detectives in East London attended hundreds of ICU and IICU 
meetings and recorded their proceedings. The reports of these meetings consist of 
details of venue and attendance as well as of verbatim or precis accounts of speeches. 
There is a concentration of meetings and reports in the first months of 1930, when a 
general strike was mounted by the IICU. These reports (5) form the basis of this 
paper. We believe that they offer an unusually detailed aschival series on a single 
topic; and that - used in conjunction with other East London material to hand - they 
will provide a valuable entry into a social history of East London. That is a longer 
term project. 
In this preliminary paper, we have two aims. Firstly, the paper makes some 
comments on the language (6) of the IICU organizers in East London. What was the 
relationship between the ICU rhetoric and an audience extremely diversified in social 
and cultural terms? The documents reveal a complex interpenetration of different 
vocabularies and symbols. A tradition of resistance to colonialism, an African 
nationalist (and pan-~frican) ideology, the language of class solidarity and of 
separatist Christianity, as well as the language of Xhosa popular culture, are 
juxtaposed and interwoven. Secondly, the paper briefly describes the strike of 1930 - 
and in doing so attempts to say something about the social composition of the 11th 
in East London, the relations between leaders and followers, and to trace certain 
shifts in approach, tactics and stragegy. 
Language and Organization 
The IICU in East London attempted to organize a highly heterogeneous and 
poorly paid population of permanent industrial workers, casual labourers, domestic 
servants, and the urban unemployed. Much of the union's income seems to have come 
from collections at mass meetings. It was extremely difficult for the leadership to 
secure a constant or reliable financial base. In addition, they faced frequent 
(sometimes well founded) accusations of peculation; they operated within an atmosphere 
of factionalism; and they were confronted with statutory and informal barriers to the 
operation of Black worker organizations. In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that there was a preoccupation with the need for organizational unity, loyalism, 
obedience, and financial obligations: many meetings were largely given over to 
exhortations to join, to pay subscriptions, to remain faithful. The urgings were 
underwritten with the promise that the IICU could deliver - not only higher wages but 
also political liberation. Successful trade union organization became an almost 
obsessive end in itself; unity became not only a desirable goal but also the pre- 
condition on which the promise of delivery was based. "Smuts and Hertzog would like 
to  shoot me", asserted Kadalie, "but my l a s t  words would be ' s t ick  to  your union' .l1 
The language of class  sol idari ty was invoked by I I C U  leaders ("workers 
throughout the world are forming themselves into bodies and take as  the i r  motto that  
employers must be controlled by the workerst'), but only infrequently. The 
fragmentation of the urban population of East London provided an inappropriate social 
base f o r  an ideology of class-defined unity. Moreover, the context of institutionalized 
racism and white dominance meant that  black nationalism, nation-building, and pan- 
Africanism were the most frequent and potent idioms of unity. Typically, the message 
was that  "the I I C U  w i l l  help you become a free black nationt1. 
Kadalie himself referred frequently t o  a recent successful example of 
nationalism - the r i s e  of an Afrikaner National Party under Hertzog - and called on 
Africans to surrender local  or  " tr ibal t1 identi ty in favour of a broad nationalism. 
Speakers linked the great independent chiefs of the past to  urge a militant and pan- 
t r iba l  nationalism. However, a t  the same time, and especially i n  the speeches of local 
organizers, specific appeals were also made to a Xhosa identity: "the bones of Hintaa: 
w i l l  r i s e  and help us." The history of Xhosa resistance during the century of 
f ront ie r  wars had i t s  own pantheon; and the I I C U  used local  chiefs as  speakers, 
cashing i n  on a lineage of militancy as well as  upon the authority chief exerted upon 
rura l  and migrant members. A t  times, i t  i s  clear,  this approach was a conscious one; 
Alfred Mnika, addressing the rural  people of Mooiplaats, introduced himself thus: 
"I a m  Mnika M w a r i  Isibongo, I belong to  Hintsa's family." 
I f  appeals to a Xhosa past resonated especially with t radi t ional i s t  mig~ants ,  
a linked tradi t ion had great appeal, particularly to  many Christians. Xhosa 
nationalism was bound up with the century-old t radi t ion of Xhosa Christianity, 
personified i n  Ntsikana, an early convert ( ~ ' ~ t s i k a n a ,  our prophet, told our forefathers 
not to  follow the customs of the white man"). I I C U  meetings i n  East London were 
suffused with the language of independent churches. On the one hand, there was a 
strong anti-missionary s t ra in ,  with c a l l s  f o r  a black church, a black god, and a "New 
Reformationt'; on the other hand, there was constant use of b ib l ica l  imagery - Kadalie 
was the "prophet of God", the "son of C h r i s t " ,  a "black Moses". Utterances based on 
b ib l ica l  texts  of deliverance o r  revelation were also a readily available means of 
conveying the message of militancy or  violence. The ICU clearly responded to  an 
exist ing separati.st ideology: trade unionism and the independent church could be 
fused - 
When I speak t o  you about seeking a new God f o r  the 
black races, I don' t mean that  you should not go to  
churches, I mean that  we should form our own church, 
and a l l  of us must carry the [IICU] yellow tickets.  
A s  well as  the language of trade unionism, of nationalism, and of Christianity 
which I I C U  speakers could use e i ther  separately or i n  s t a r t l i ng  combinations - a further  
f e r t i l e  source of imagery was the Xhosa popular culture, which bridged the rura l  and 
urban worlds. Most noticeably a f t e r  the defeat of the s t r ike  i n  1930, the ICU made 
an increasingly expl ic i t  bid f o r  the allegiance of the "red" f a m  labourer or  peasant- 
migrant. Kadalie expressed his own pride i n  being "the leader of the raw natives" 
( t h i s  w a s  good pol i t ics ,  i f  an unlikely claim) ; and another speaker said that  i n  the 
rural areas "red women joyfully dragged the i r  blankets t o  meet us". This meant that  
trade unionists addressed audiences who saw no incongruity i n  being urged t o  pay 
subscriptions a t  the behest of "the talking crow of Kentanill, o r  told of dreams of 
"locusts r iding on an ass" by Selina Bungane, a "kitchen maid" described laconically 
by a black detective as  "an ICU member and prophetesstt. 
The vasious idioms of mobilization used by I I C U  leaders should not submerge 
the i r  ro le  - and self-conviction - as  trade unionists, nor the i r  concern t o  prescribe 
precise and instrumental action a t  appropriate times. Outgunned as  African workers 
were, there was an objective need t o  maintain united an6 non-violent action a t  times 
of confrontation, and the January 1930 instructions exemplified a recurrent emphasis 
on non-violent tactics: s t r ike r s  were not to  carry s t icks  o r  any other weapons; they 
must abstain from alcohol; and so on. Despite th i s  s t ress  on pacific procedures, 
despite the admiration f o r  Gandhi, and the sense of the need f o r  union discipline, 
the theme of violence constantly surfaced i n  the speeches and meetings. There was a 
persistent reci tat ion of the history of violence, of the everyday experience of the 
callous bru ta l i ty  of inter-racial contacts, and predictions of an imminent "great 
war"  between black and white. Not only is the language i t s e l f  frequently lurid,  but 
there i s  a submerged real izat ion i n  the speeches that  violence might ultimately be 
the only means of a l te r ing  the balance of power. 
The Str ike of 1930 
The 1930 s t r ike  mounted by the I I C U  i n  East London has been described 
dismissively by Wickins: i t  
can only be regarded as  a failure. Though perhaps f o r  
a day or  two as  much as  80 per cent of the Black labour 
force of the c i t y  stayed away from work ... the stoppage 
was short-lived and pa r t i a l  . . .  h he s t r ike  J had been 
ill-conceived and has t i ly  executed without preparation. (7) 
I n  common with other accounts of the s t r ike ,  Wickins a s m e s  that  the s t r ike  
effectively came t o  an end with the a r re s t  of Kadalie and the s t r ike  committee eleven 
days a f t e r  i t  bagan; that  when (on January 28th) Kadalie "sent orders to the s t r ikers  
to  return to work . . . They did so.'! (8) This f a i l s  to recognize some of the most 
interest ing features of the strike: i n  particular,  the breach between the s t r ike  
committee leadership and the rank and f i l e ;  the prolongation of the i r  stoppage by some 
s t r ikers  f o r  s i x  months; a display of spontaneous mass c i v i l  disobedience; the social 
composition of the s tr ikers;  and the significance of the support forthcoming from 
women domestic servants.  h his l a s t  feature was noted by Monica Hunter.) Wickinsf S 
description of the s t r ike  i s  certainly a t  variance with one penned by the magistrate 
of East London i n  h i s  confidential report to  the Holloway ( ~ a t i v e  ~conomic) Commission 
i n  1931. He spoke of a s t r ike  "which lasted nearly s ix  months and involved some 
thousands of natives" and which saw "a large number of men and women out of work and 
penniless". (9) 
The s t r ike  began on January 16th 1930, on the expiry of an I I C U  ultimatum, 
as  a withdrawal of labour by employees of the South African Railways and Harbours. 
The c a l l  was f o r  a wage r i s e  from 3/6d per day to 6/6d. The s t r ike  committee held a 
ser ies  of daily meetings, attended by two, three, and four thousand people (and on one 
occasion 8,000 were reported) ; i t  sought funds from a variety of external sources as 
well as  from local  subscriptions. There was a pronounced emphasis on discipline and 
obedience to the leadership i n  the speeches made a t  the s t r ike ' s  outset. Kadalie 
told them that  he was going to be General. I have made 
many s t r ikes  i n  t h i s  country, we have got to  be orderly 
not to  walk about the s t ree ts ,  you must stay i n  the 
locations ... I want to  make it  c lear  to  you that  we 
are not going to  f ight  with s t icks,  the others have 
aeroplanes and guns. 
A few days l a t e r  he returned to  the theme: 
We are the leaders, we are your Generals ... We axe 
going to  form our own l i t t l e  Government, employ our own 
police to  do the picketing ... There w i l l  be no drink 
because we cannot control you when you are drunk. 
And Peter Mkwambi urged h i s  l i s t ene r s  
to  remember that  the s t r ike  organisation i s  l i k e  a t ra in ,  
i t  only has one head and I want you to  l i s t e n  t o  the 
Str ike Committee, remember we are fighting with our 
brains and not sticks. 
There was a great deal of popular sympathy f o r  the SAELH s t r ikers ,  and on 
the third day of the s t r ike  Kadalie said the Committee had decided "to lay the 
position before the women of the location". Amidst loud support from the women he 
called on them 
t o  be the pickets i n  the i r  own homes, they must stop 
the i r  husbands and the i r  sweethearts from going to  
work, should he be a coward and go to  work you must 
refuse to  cook food ... 
On the following day,  a general s t r ike  was announced. Four days in to  the general 
s t r ike,  on Saturday 24 Januasy, a crowd of 4000 gathered, including a "commando" of 
about 1000 men described by the police as  "marching i n  sections of fours". Kadalie 
and other speakers made a se r i e s  of mil i tant  speeches, promising tha t  on the Monday 
picketing would be great ly increased. On the following day, Sunday, Kadalie and the 
ent i re  Str ike Committee were invited to  a private negotiating session with Major 
Lister,  Distr ict  Commandant of Police. Upon asr ival  i n  h i s  office, they were 
surrounded by m e d  policemen, arrested, and charged with incitement to  public 
violence. 
On January 28 Kadalie and his Committee colleagues made a court appearance, 
and a l e t t e r  from them was read t o  the large crowd gathered outside. It said that  
the Strike Committee had decided that the s t r ike  must be called off ,  and that  a l l  
workers must return to  the i r  posts: "You must go back to  work immediately and eaxn 
money t o  subscribe t o  our defence.ll The Daily Dispatch reporter noted that  th i s  
message was not well received by many i n  -the crowd of 3,500. (10) On the next day 
Alex Fifana and John Mciza wrote on behalf of a "Rank and F i l e  Committee" refusing 
Kadalie's advice: "We shal l  not return to work u n t i l  our employers comply with our 
demands. (11) 
This breach persisted i n  the months that  followed. Unfortunately, l i t t l e  
evidence i s  available f o r  this phase of the s t r ike  - but what does exis t  may be 
summarized. It appears that  women, especially domestic servants, were an important 
element i n  those that  stayed out on strike. Further, from various accounts, i t  seems 
that  the rank and f i l e  s t r ikers  were drawn largely from the ranks of casual labourers, 
from marginally employed and lumpen elements. Police said that  there were many 
"habitual unemployed and kwedines" a t  the meetings. There do not appear to  have been 
similar formally organized meetings on the l ines  mounted by Kadalie; instead ( a  
report of 27 February said) 
There appears to  be a more or  l e s s  continuous gathering 
of natives on the football  ground, and it  is  stated that  
the atmosphere is  cloudy with impending trouble. Scrub 
women and casual labourers, a t  work during the day, join 
the gathering i n  the evenings, and appear to  support the 
non-workers . (12) 
Further, during February, the s t r ikers  increasingly raised issues other than wages: 
the system of location permits, the pressure on beer brewing, location housing, and 
SO on. 
On Februaxy 21, a dramatic episode took place. Twelve people were charged 
f o r  being i n  the location without permits. A week l a t e r  
The native clerks pointed out that  i t  was d i f f i cu l t  t o  
so r t  out the bona f ide  applicants because al l  the 
loafers ,  hooligans, k a f f i r  beer traders, etc., had 
joined the ranks of the s t r ikers ,  and the s t r ike r s  
claimed equal treatment f o r  them. (13) 
A crowd of about 3000 marched from the location in to  the c i t y  centre and gathered 
outside the courtrooms; a deputation announced that  
I f  i t  was the intention of the authorities to  apply 
the [permit] regulation to s t r ikers ,  large numbers 
would be l i ab le  to asrest ,  including the majority of 
demonstrators, who had come to surrender themselves. 
The senior magistrate said there was no intention of "interfering with genuine 
strikers"; the rank and f i l e  committee undertook to  pay the f ines of the twelve, who 
were then released. T h i s  action by the committee, and the i r  subsequent decision t o  
take out permits themselves, cost them some popular support; by February 27 they 
I were said to  have "become out of favour" i n  the location. Most of the s t r ikers  - 
l those who could f ind re-employment - straggled back to work by May and June; the 
l l a s t  reference to  "bitter-enders" i s  on 16 July. 
Clearly, Kadalie and the I I C U  leadership had l o s t  ground. To reassert  the 
union's standing, to  recover i t s  membership, the leadership now embarked on 
significant sh i f t s  of emphasis and tact ics .  These included: a greater ro le  by 
independent church leaders; more expl ic i t  appeal to  women; an expl ic i t  drive f o r  
rural  membership; and a greater reliance on tradi t ional  leaders. (~nasmuch as  these 
changing tac t ics  were successful, they are probably responsible f o r  the f ac t  noted, 
but not explained, by Wickins that  the I I C U  "continued to  enjoy considerable support 
i n  East London, where, well in to  1931, subscriptions were running a t  something l ike  
$2100 a month . . .l'. ) (14) 
The greater use of religious imagery, and the more frequent appearances on 
I I C U  platforms of churchmen, was part ly a simple attempt to f i l l  the vacuum created 
by the ar res t  of Kadalie and the Str ike Committee. A Rev. Nonkonyane was ubiquitous 
i n  l a t e  January and early February. ( ~ e  saw his role as  placatory, and a t  a meeting 
on 10 February, when the gathering became rest ive and threatening, he told the police 
present that  he could no longer control them.) I n  h i s  report on the meetings of 1st 
and 2nd February, Detective-Sergeant Mandy said they were "purely religious gatherings"; 
but by February 4th he made t h i s  comment on a meeting held the previous day: 
The meeting was conducted on purely religious l ines ,  
the speakers reading and quoting re la t ive  passages 
from the bible ... Some of these passages though 
couched i n  b ib l ica l  terms and quotations have 
pract ical ly the same meaning as conveyed by the 
inflammatory speeches of Kadalie and h i s  Str ike 
Committee. 
And, on June 29, the same detective wrote a brief  special report i n  which he concluded 
that  
From the general r u n  of all the speeches made a t  those 
meetings, which were purely religious, i t  would appear 
that  the Independent ICU are adopting different tac t ics  
using Christianity as  a means of promoting good feeling 
between the members ... 
l Another s h i f t  which i s  apparent stemmed from the staunch support f o r  Kadalie 
and f o r  the s t r ike  amongst the women of the location. A number of "location issues" 
were increasingly taken up by the I I C U  leaders. The brewing of beer nicely i l l u s t r a t e s  
this .  On January 18, Kadalie told h i s  audience that  i f  the s t r ike  succeeded women 
would no longer need to  brew (i.e. to  supplement the i r  wages). By ~ a ~ / ~ u n e ,  however, 
the emphasis was quite different: beer-brewing was seen as  a r ight  to  be defended. 
"Why should not you s e l l  beer?" asked Joel Magade. !'Liquor i s  poisonous but Kaffir 
beer i s  not." The I I C U  attempted t o  take up with the Just ice Department cases of 
police entering homes t o  search f o r  beer. 
Another consequence of the s t r ike  was a closer al l iance between the I I C U  and 
the t radi t ional  Gcaleka leadership. One week in to  the s t r ike ,  chiefs Pakamela and 
Sigidi (from Kentani and Idutywa, respectively) addressed large crowds i n  East London. 
The r ightful  owners of the land, they said, were the "red natives"; Pakamela appealed 
to  all Africans to  ''unite in to  one strong body" - and added that  God would s t r ike  down 
any who scabbed. This enrolment of the chiefs a s  I I C U  orators reflected the salience 
of the migrant hinterland i n  East London's work force - and tha t  hinterland became 
much more important i n  the months that  followed. 
The I I C U  leaders acquired a motor car, and used it to  send delegates into 
the Ciskei and Transkei. By July it was boasted that  5000 members had been enrolled 
a t  Kentani and 4000 i n  Idutywa. Other Transkei chiefs - it  was announced i n  August - 
were writing to  the I I C U  asking f o r  meetings i n  the i r  d is t r ic t s .  Rural issues were 
addressed. A t  the same meeting that  saw Mnika introduce himself a s  belonging t o  
Hintsa's family, he promised that  the d i s t r i c t  secretary would speak on "why we 
cannot have intonjane and &eta dances"; i n  November 1930, Magade castigated 
"people who are wearing European clothes1' a s  "Hottentotsl', and told his hearers to 
"follow the r i t e s  of your ancestors", c i t ing  the authority of the prophetic crow of 




loss  of lands. 1 
I 
These responses by the I I C U  indicate the pressures from below - and they 
remind one of the fragmented, variegated population i n  East London i t s e l f .  The ICU 
was not - could not be - a trade union based on a single trade; nor was i t  a 
"general union" of all urban workers. Its social base was broader and l e s s  coherent. 
Hitherto analysis of the ICU has been preoccupied with organizational problems; t h i s  
paper has suggested that  consideration of the language of the I I C U  reveals something 
of the milieu and methods of the movement. 
The trade union overlaid and was influenced by older forms of organization 
and consciousness amongst migrants and other urban workers. The I I C U  organizers 
sought t o  combine mil i tant  c lass  action and black nationalism, and to  substitute this 
combination fo r  more parochial, past icular is t  forms of consciousness. The 1930 s t r ike  
suggests that  they had some limited success i n  this endeavour - although the leadership 
clearly l o s t  control over a more militant rank and f i l e  element as  the s t r ike  
progressed. Faced with s t a t e  repression and hamstrung by financial d i f f icu l t ies ,  the 
I I C U  leaders had to  remain sensitive to the diverse forms of expression and symbols 
i n  order to a t t r a c t  and maintain a following. The incorporation of separat is t  church 
ideology and the use of Xhosa traditions and culture intensified, most mazkedly i n  the 
speeches by local  o f f i c i a l s  rather  than by Kadalie and the other national leaders. 
I n  South Africa today, black trade unionism, unemployment, and police 
surveillance l i e  close to  the heart of the struggle. The fifty-year old documents on 
which this paper i s  based have some thing to  say about these issues. They are also 
part of an h is tor ica l  legacy of resistance, and the legacy has not yet  been fu l ly  
claimed. One ICU s t a l w a r t  who clearly had a concept of a "usable past" was 
A. W. G. Champion. Addressing a meeting i n  East London on December 12 1930, he said: 
What I want you now to  do i s  to  keep your native 
Cape history. It must be written and kept fo r  
future generations. 
(1) Martin Legassick, Class and Nationalism i n  South African Protest: the SACP and 
the "Native Republic", 1928-34 (Syracuse University, 1973), p. 7. 
(2) The classic  account of this cleavage, dubbed "redf1 and "school", based on East 
London material, is P. Mayer, Tribesmen o r  Townsmen (cape Town, 1961). 
In 1928, infant mortality figures reached a staggering 543 per 1000. See the 
Report f o r  the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) f o r  East London (EL) fo r  1928, 
i n  Cape Archives (CA), ~ / E L N  vol. 624. For the response to  the problem, see, 
e.g., Daily Dispatch, 9 December 1929, edi torial .  
When the EL mayor introduced C. T. Loram a t  the inaugural meeting of the Native 
Welfare Association in the c i ty ,  he said: "The si tuat ion i n  South Africa i s  
rapidly becoming c r i t i ca l .  Such events as  the Lovedale s tr ike,  the Port 
Elizabeth r i o t  and the Queenstown land seizure are but the outward and v is ib le  
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Where relevant, the date of the meeting and/or the report i s  indicated. 
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